§ I. Whose Fallacy is it Anyway?

Whereas proponents of Critical Race Theory (hereafter, CRT) once claimed that “social justice contras”1 were ignorantly protesting CRT, they are now claiming that our criticisms are fallacious forms of genetic reasoning.2 Given that this latter accusation is a tacit admission that we are not ignorant of CRT, it follows that CRT proponents are the ones who are arguing fallaciously by moving the goalposts. The fallacy of moving the goalposts is committed when a speaker/writer demands that his debate opponent meet some criterion, but changes the criterion to be met when his opponent has met his initial demand. In the case of CRT’s incompatibility with Christianity, consider the following example –

Person A – “If you want me to take your arguments against CRT seriously, then you need to prove to me that you know what you’re talking about.” 

Person B – “CRT is x. It originated with y, was passed down through z, and is now held primarily by people from w.” 

Person A – “That’s all well and good, but how can I take your arguments against CRT seriously when you haven’t sufficiently demonstrated a link between CRT and the possibility of it being anti-Christian?”

This example of moving the goalposts, moreover, is only one level of fallacious counter-reasoning by proponents of CRT, for we have elsewhere shown quite clearly how CRT’s philosophical underpinnings are inseparable from its use as an “analytical tool.”3 What is argued against by the CRT proponent, therefore, is a straw man. Furthermore, the accusation that opponents of CRT have committed the genetic fallacy is ironic, given that CRT’s foundational assumptions are prime examples of the genetic fallacy.

In what follows, we will demonstrate how CRT is built and thrives upon the genetic fallacy. Additionally, it will be demonstrated from Scripture itself that some forms of genetic reasoning are not fallacious, and that our criticism of CRT falls under this category of valid genetic reasoning.

§ II. The Genetic Fallacy, Genealogical Analysis, & CRT

According to philosopher Frank Scalambino,

One commits the genetic fallacy (GnF) when advocating for a conclusion based solely on origin. This is a fallacy of relevance – irrelevance, really – because the origin of a claim may be irrelevant to its truth‐value. That is to say, providing an account of the genesis of a claim, its history or origin, may be informative and helpful; however, it need not determine the truth‐value of the claim. Therefore, when one draws a conclusion regarding the truth‐value of a claim based solely on the origin of the claim, then one may have committed the GnF.4

Scalambino’s explanation of the fallacy is particularly helpful, for he specifically identifies the theories of Michel Foucault and Sigmund Freud, two of CRT’s main philosophical progenitors, as utilizing the fallacy. Scalambino –

...Freud’s critique of religion involves tracing the genesis of religious belief for the sake of identifying a “wish” that such belief might be understood as fulfilling. That is to say, given the manner in which, when essentially helpless, children may be said to simultaneously fear parental figures while hoping for care from them, Freud identifies such a relation as the origin of later religious belief. 

Though...Freud’s genetic account may successfully propagate suspicion regarding religious belief and perhaps raise reasonable doubts, it does not necessitate that religious claims are false. Hence, were one to conclude in favor of atheism on the grounds of Freud’s argument, then one would be drawing a conclusion from fallacious reasoning. Similarly, Michel Foucault’s...genealogies regarding the claims upon which various societal institutions and conventions stand may also be seen in this light. That is to say, even considering knowledge and belief as social phenomena, illuminating the history upon which a social practice has emerged does not necessitate the falsehood of the principle for which it stands... 

Moreover, similar to the ability of Freud’s genetic accounts to provoke or incite suspicion, indicating the presence or absence of particular social practices among other historical periods or cultures may be helpful for illuminating different perspectives regarding current social practices; however, even convincingly showing the genesis of current social practices does not determine the truth‐value of claims that form the foundation of such practices.5

This kind of reasoning is fallacious because, as Kevin C. Klement explains,

...such things as the identity of who makes a statement, has a belief or advances an argument, and what brings him, her or them to do so are all taken to be generally irrelevant to a statement’s truth or an argument’s soundness. Whether or not a statement or belief is true is entirely a matter of its content.

[…]

If an argument is valid and has true premises, the argument is sound, regardless of the culture, class, race, gender, sexual orientation and political motives of the person advancing it, and regardless of the historical circumstances in which it is advanced.6

This is an elementary fallacy to commit, yet as noted above this kind of thinking, far from being uncommon in the history of philosophy and its cousin disciplines,7 has been the root fallacy at work in the writings of the philosophers and thinkers central to CRT’s core assumptions.

By his appropriation and transformation of Paul Rée’s genealogical method of analyzing morality8 Friedrich Nietzsche sought to demonstrate that traditional values and beliefs in religion and philosophy were not truths revealed by “N”ature or the Christian God, or any deity for that matter, but inextricably historically rooted social constructions. As Ken Gemes notes, Nietzsche thought that “all our beliefs [are] thoroughly conditioned,”9 perspectives that are irreducibly “human, all to human.” The philosophical and religious “will to truth” – whether in the realms of ethics, epistemology, or metaphysics – was viewed by the philosopher as a means of concealing a more primordial “will to power.” Gemes explains that according to Nietzsche,

In believing we are not reporting how the world is; rather, we are prescribing a way of looking at the world, a means for furthering a particular form of life. To bring others to share one's views is not to bring them into harmony with the pre-existing order; it is to create the very order one is allegedly describing…

While Nietzsche says that all will to truth is a will to power, in the case of his “genuine philosophers” it is a will to power that recognizes itself as such. In the case of others, for instance, Christians, it is, according to Nietzsche, a will that does not recognize itself as a will to power, preferring to hide itself with a pretense of disinterested, passive objectivity.10

Nietzsche sought to lay bare the human all to human basis for concepts and values that have been understood to be “just there” or revealed by God through by tracing the historical roots of those concepts and values.

As noted above, Freud sought to do the same in the realm of religious belief as a psychologist, and Foucault sought to do the same in his assessment of social institutions as a whole, specifically focusing in on educational and carceral institutions.11 With respect to Foucault, one of the more important sources of CRT’s foundational assumptions, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow write –

[Foucault] argues that modern power is tolerable on the condition that it masks itself – which it has done very effectively. If truth is outside of and opposed to power, then the speaker’s benefit is merely an incidental plus. But if truth and power are not external to each other, as Foucault obviously...maintains, then the speaker’s benefit and associated ploys are among the essential ways in which modern power operates. It masks itself by producing a discourse, seemingly opposed to it but really part of a larger deployment of modern power.12

Since knowledge, including moral and legal knowledge, serves to conceal other aims – namely, the aims of power – then it follows that the only way to deal with an offered philosophical, religious, ethical, or legal proposition or set of propositions is by subjecting that proposition or set of propositions to a genealogical analysis. Finding the origin of the proposition or set of propositions will result in validation or invalidation of the proposition or set of propositions.

It is this genealogical method of analysis, in psychology and history, that was brought first into Critical Legal Studies, and then into Critical Race Theory. As Nietzsche, Freud, and Foucault taught, CRT maintains that belief, values, and truths are not “just there” in “N”ature or divinely revealed – either by means of direct, indirect, general, or special revelation – but are socially constructed. They are means of exercising power. For as Farber and Sherry accurately relay, in CRT proponents “knowledge and power are...conflated.”13 Consequently, as was the case with Nietzsche and Freud and Foucault, in CRT the origin of a particular proposition or moral declamation is fundamental to judging the value of that proposition. For

...knowledge is intensely personal. Personal perspective, however, is not individual. Instead, it is based on membership in a group. Like everything else, knowledge is also political in the sense that it is a method of maintaining established hierarchies. Knowledge thus cannot be evaluated apart from the social roles—and, in particular, the race and gender—of those who claim to know.14

CRT proponents

...believe...that western ideas and institutions are socially constructed to serve the interests of the powerful, especially straight, white men. This leads them to attack such core concepts as truth, merit, and the rule of law...attack[ing] the concepts of reason and objective truth, condemning them as components of white male domination.15

Hence, “the idea of reason cannot be understood in the absence of the background knowledge about power relationships,”16 What was part and parcel of Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, Reason, Truth, and Objectivity became part and parcel of Freud and Foucault’s critique of History, Society, Reason, Truth, and Objectivity. And it is the driving methodology of CRT. For Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault, and CRT proponents the genetic fallacy is an indispensable tool.17

[To be continued in Pt.2]

1 The term “social justice contras” refers to Christian opponents of the evangelical appropriation of CRT and its attendant social justice concerns, in which the present author is included.

2 Let the reader note that this is not a new tactic, but one that has been taken several years ago as well. For instance, see Smith, William H. “I Think I’ve Been Intellectually Snobbed,” The Aquila Report, https://www.theaquilareport.com/think-ive-intellectually-snobbed, April 4, 2017.

3 See Diaz, Hiram R. “The AntiChristian Roots of Critical Race Theory,” InvoSpec, https://involutedgenealogies.wordpress.com/2018/10/05/the-antichristian-roots-of-critical-race-theory/; Diaz, Hiram R. “Is Critical Race Theory AntiChristian? Yes.,” Biblical Trinitarian, http://www.biblicaltrinitarian.com/2018/11/is-critical-race-theory-anti-christian.html.

4 “Genetic Fallacy” in Bad Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Fallacies in Western Philosophy, eds. Robert Arp, Steven Barbone, and Michael Bruce (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2019), 160.

5 Bad Arguments, 161. (emphasis added)

6 “When is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?” in Argumentation: An International Journal on Reasoning 16 (2002), 385. (emphasis added)

7 e.g. psychology, literary criticism, literary theory, etc.

8 See Coy, David C. “Nietzsche, Hume, and the Genealogical Method,” in Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker: Papers Presented at the Fifth Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, ed. Yovel Yirmiyahu (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), 20-38.

9 “Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 52, No.1 (March: 1992), 51.

10 Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth, 52. (emphasis added)

11 Some have argued against the claim that Nietzsche and Foucault were guilty of committing the genetic fallacy, however a strong case may be made that these counter-arguments are guilty of special pleading. On this matter, see Koopman, Collin. “Two Uses of Genealogy: Michel Foucault and Bernard Williams” in Foucault’s Legacy ed. C. G. Prado (New York: Continuum, 2009), 90-108; Evans, Fred. “Genealogy and The Problem of Affirmation in Nietzsche, Foucault and Bakhtin” in Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol. 27 No. 3 (2001), 41-65; and Kleiman, Lowell. “Pashman on Freud and the Genetic Fallacy” in Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spring: 1970), 63-65.

12 Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 2nd Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 130.

13 Farber, Daniel A., Sherry, Suzanna. Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 31.

14 ibid., 29.

15 ibid., 5.

16 ibid., 28.

17 Regarding Foucault’s influence on CRT, Farber and Sherry further explain –

In addition to their focus on race, gender, and sexuality, the new radical multiculturalists [including the Critical Race Theorists] expanded the core ideas of CLS [i.e. Critical Legal Studies] by emphasizing the thought of French postmodernists such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. This meant extending the insight that law is socially constructed into an argument that everything is socially constructed. 

[...] 

Although CLS was mostly interested in indeterminacy as a way of threatening law's legitimacy, the new radicals were more concerned with how indeterminacy conceals racism and sexism. This view had its roots in another strand of CLS scholarship. Although CLS scholarship had often focused on the inevitable incoherence of legal doctrine, some critical legal scholars also suggested that indeterminacy allowed judges to combine progressive-sounding rhetoric with oppressive results. Thus, legal discourse “conceals and reinforces relations of domination.” The late Alan Freeman, for example, argued in one of the earliest CLS articles that antidiscrimination law actually undermined the cause of racial equality and legitimated discrimination...The radical multiculturalists focused on this legitimating function of law, finding confirmation in Foucault's writings. Where some had found doctrinal incoherence, the new radicals found instead a deliberate concentration of power in the white male establishment. Law (as well as everything else) is constructed by the powerful to maintain and enhance their own power. Derrick Bell, for instance, argues that Brown v. Board of Education actually served the interests of whites at least as much as it furthered the interests of blacks. Indeed, he contends that as a general matter, “the interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.” Radical feminist Robin West contends that our legal, political, and social cultures are “pervasively misogynist.” The radicals thus focus on the roles played by race and gender in the social construction of reality. Their mission is to expose the specific power relations that underlie legal doctrine and practice.

Beyond All Reason, 22-23. (emphasis added)

§ I. Introduction: There Are No Atheists

For centuries, many apologists have presented arguments in defense of the existence of God to men who self-identify as atheists. Yet the Scriptures are clear on this matter –

...what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse. For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened.1

In addition to having had the sin and guilt of Adam imputed to himself, fallen man also incurs the wrath of God because he knows God is the Creator, Law-Giver, and Judge of all men, and yet refuses to honor God as God or give him thanks. Paul’s words here are universal and, therefore, exclude no person who ever has lived, is now living, or will ever live subsequent to the Fall.

There is no question about the matter – God reveals to us that there are no atheists. Instead, there are idolaters who have “exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and reptiles.”2 Rather than trusting the Word of God, the professed atheist trusts in his own word. Rather than obeying God’s moral law, the professed atheist establishes his own rule of conduct. Rather than working within the metaphysical framework revealed by God to man in his Word, the atheist constructs his own metaphysical framework in which he seeks to operate free from the ontological and providential strictures placed upon him by God.

Psalms 14 and 53 are often cited as proof that the Scriptures recognize some men who are actually atheists, but these psalms do no such thing. Their shared opening line – “The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God’” – is a concise way of expressing the attitude of the unbeliever who thinks that the one true God will not bring his (i.e. the atheist’s) thoughts, words, and deeds into judgment. As Willem A. VanGemeren explains –

The word “fool” is synonymous with “wicked”...It reflects the wisdom tradition where the “fool” aggressively and intentionally flouts independence from God and his commandments...

[…]

The denial of God is not an absolute denial of his existence. The pagans around Israel believed in many gods, and the impious in Israel did not rationalistically deny the historic and cultural links between the Lord and Israel. In their impudence fools disregard God’s expectations. God is not important in their lives. They shut off the affairs of this world from divine intervention and deny any personal accountability to God for their actions.3

No man is truly an atheist; rather, all men know God by means of direct revelation to them. What can be known of him has been made known to them by God. However, fallen men pervert the truth about him, ascribe divine attributes to his creation, and show themselves to be idolaters by worshiping a divinized creation.

§ II. What is an Atheist?

Hence, the atheist is an idolater who replaces the Creator with the creature, imbuing the creation with divine attributes in one way or another. For instance, the materialist believes that matter is everywhere (i.e. omnipresent), the source of all potential and actual power (i.e. omnipotent), and the source of all knowledge and consciousness (i.e. omniscient). Matter is literally the alpha and the omega of all things. It is a se, seeing as it is not dependent on anything for its existence, but instead is the source of all that exists. Even the atheist’s moral code is dictated to him by the creation indirectly (as in the case of deriving one’s sense of right and wrong from observing animal social conduct) or directly (as in the case of issuing commands to others and oneself upon the basis of one’s perceived autonomous authority).

Atheism differs from other forms of idolatry, however, because its “unknown God” is neither a crude mythological deity whose attributes and actions are exaggerated human attributes and actions, nor is its “unknown God” personal and, therefore, an imitation of Yahweh. The “unknown God” of the atheists is an abstraction from both of these theological sources. For, on the one hand, the atheist believes that everything is ultimately physical; while, on the other hand, the atheist believes that the physical alpha and omega is elemental and knowable by means of abstraction. It is not this or that physical object perceptible to the senses that is the atheist’s god, it is the immanent physical ground of all derivative physical beings.

This is not, of course, how atheists would self-identify. Rather, contemporary atheists at the popular level define their position as “a lack of belief in gods.”4 Note that this definition does not speak to the objective state of affairs that obtains (i.e. whether or not God exists), as it is a description of an individual’s psychological state. Whereas “older dictionaries define[d] atheism as ‘a belief that there is no God,’”5 contemporary atheists will often argue that these older definitions are due to “theistic influences,”6 and that “without the (mono)theistic influence, the definition would at least read ‘there are no gods.’”7 However, this is not the case, as philosopher Paul Draper explains –

“Atheism” is typically defined in terms of “theism”. Theism, in turn, is best understood as a proposition—something that is either true or false. It is often defined as “the belief that God exists”, but here “belief” means “something believed”. It refers to the propositional content of belief, not to the attitude or psychological state of believing. This is why it makes sense to say that theism is true or false and to argue for or against theism. If, however, “atheism” is defined in terms of theism and theism is the proposition that God exists and not the psychological condition of believing that there is a God, then it follows that atheism is not the absence of the psychological condition of believing that God exists (more on this below). The “a-” in “atheism” must be understood as negation instead of absence, as “not” instead of “without”. Therefore, in philosophy at least, atheism should be construed as the proposition that God does not exist (or, more broadly, the proposition that there are no gods).

This definition has the added virtue of making atheism a direct answer to one of the most important metaphysical questions in philosophy of religion, namely, “Is there a God?” There are only two possible direct answers to this question: “yes”, which is theism, and “no”, which is atheism.8

From this it follows that it is not incorrect to define atheism as the belief that God does not exist or, what is essentially the same thing, to define an atheist as one who assents to the proposition that God does not exist.

§ III. The Logical Problem

Thus far we have taken for granted that the assertion “God exists” is one that may be meaningfully denied. However, is this the case? What does it mean to affirm that God exists? Logically speaking the word “is” functions as the copula connecting the subject term of a proposition to its attendant predicate term, as the following diagram demonstrates –

The assertion “God exists,” then, expresses either one of the following propositions –

1. A particular logical subject of predication [viz. God] has the property of being a logical subject of predication.
2. A particular logical subject of predication [viz. God] has the property of x [i.e. an undefined property signified by the word exists].

Whereas proposition 2. may be translated into a non-tautologous proposition (e.g. “God exists” = “God is an extra-conceptual being with all of the attributes classically and biblically ascribed to him”), proposition 1. is a tautology that is true of any given logical subject of predication. More concisely, if the assertion “God exists” is not idiomatic shorthand for a lengthier proposition in which attributes are predicated of God (e.g. “God is a non-fictional/extraconceptual being”), then it is akin to asserting x is x. This being the case, it follows that unless the atheist defines his terminology, explaining what he means when he says “God does not exist,” his assertion is at best ambiguous. And at worst, it is self-contradictory, for the assertion “God does not exist” would then be logically identical to the proposition “This logical subject of predication [viz. God] has the property of not being a logical subject of predication [i.e. “not existing”].” This is not a return to Anselm’s Ontological Argument, but a simple recognition of a logical problem facing the atheist. If “being” cannot be divorced from “being the logical subject of predication,” and it cannot, then one cannot rationally deny the “existence” of any logical subject once it has been verbally, or by some other means of communication, identified as a logical subject.

§ IV. Who or What are Rightly Called Atheists?

Before examining the meaning of the assertion “God does not exist,” we must first do away with the popular level definition of atheism as a lack of belief in gods by subjecting it to scrutiny. Below we will look at some, but not all, of the problems that the popular definition of atheism entails.

1. The Problem of Non-conscious Beings

If atheism is a lack of beliefs in gods, then any thing (being) lacking consciousness is, therefore, an atheist. Observe –

1. Non-conscious beings lack every kind of belief.
2. Belief in gods is a kind of belief.
3. Therefore, non-conscious beings lack belief in gods.

Applying the law of transitivity, we have the following –

1. If beings that lack belief in gods are atheists,
2. and non-conscious beings lack belief in gods,
3. then non-conscious beings are atheists.

This is not what the atheist intends to communicate, but it is what follows from his definition of atheism as a lack of belief in gods. In order to avoid this, the atheist must clarify what he means when defines atheism as a lack of belief in gods.

2. The Problem of Unconscious Beings

The atheist will, perhaps, clarify what he means by stating that atheism is a lack of belief in gods found among personal beings with the capacity for consciousness, but this is only a little bit better. Consider –

1. Atheism is a lack of belief in gods found among consciousness-capable beings.
2. Consciousness-capable beings are categorizable as either conscious or unconscious.
3. Therefore, atheism is a lack of belief in gods found among conscious or unconscious consciousness-capable beings.

What is more, assuming for the sake of argument that it is possible for a person to become absolutely unconscious in the cases of sleep, medically induced comas, accidentally induced comas, and so on (an assumption to which it seems atheists would generally not object), the popular definition of atheism inexorably results in the absurdity of affirming that unconscious theists become atheists by means of their being rendered unconscious. Thus, in the case of sleeping theists it would be valid to argue the following –

1. Those who are unconscious lack all kinds of beliefs.
2. Sleeping theists are part of those who are unconscious.
3. Therefore, sleeping theists lack all kinds of beliefs.
4. If one lacks all kinds of beliefs, then one lacks a belief in gods.
5. Sleeping theists lack all kinds of beliefs.
6. Therefore, sleeping theists lack belief in gods.
7. All consciousness-capable being who lack belief in gods are atheists.
8. Sleeping theists are consciousness-capable beings who lack belief in gods.
9. Therefore, sleeping theists are atheists.

This is an absurd conclusion, but one that follows from the definition of atheism as a lack of belief in gods.

3. The Problem of Conscious Beings

What we have examined above is not a straw man of what the atheist believes, but is an examination of the logical conclusions we may derive from the atheist’s definition of atheism. We have done this in order to demonstrate that the definition given by the atheist is deficient because it would apply to a broader category of beings than that category to which the atheist intends to apply it, effectively resulting in identifying all beings as atheists. And even when qualified, the definition fails because it is still too broad, including even theists as atheists.

The atheist may attempt to further qualify his definition by stating that he is only referring to conscious consciousness-capable beings who lack belief in gods. This is better, but it is still problematic. For the sake of argument, we may grant that there exists a person whose mind is completely devoid of any ideas about God. Now let us say that this individual lives 37 years of his life without ever thinking about God, gods, cultures and individuals besides himself having or lacking belief in gods, or even his own lack of belief in gods. He is conscious of every other fact of the world capable of being known by him, as well as of his own mental life. He lacks consciousness of mainly one thing, viz. his lack of belief in gods. Suppose that this remains the case until he one day is presented with the Gospel of Christ and reflects on his mental activity, concluding that he lacks, and has always lacked, a belief in gods. Has he always been an atheist? Or has he just become an atheist? If he has always been an atheist, then it follows that those who are in an analogous situation, epistemologically speaking, are likewise atheists. This would include individuals who are cognitively undeveloped (e.g. unborn children), cognitively underdeveloped (e.g. mentally challenged persons), or who have become cognitively impaired by natural or accidental means over time (e.g. individuals with degenerative brain disease, or individuals who have experienced brain trauma).

The problem here should be evident to the attentive reader. In a word, it is this –

If a conscious individual lacks consciousness of his current lack of belief in gods, then he is no different than a person who lacks the cognitive ability to become aware of his lack of belief in gods. Consequently, there is a difference between those whose reasoning has led them to lack a belief in gods, or whose reasoning has confirmed their lack of a belief in gods as true, and those who lack the cognitive ability to rationally evaluate the arguments of theists, reject them as fallacious or unsound, and thereupon come to lack a belief in gods, etc.

To put the matter succinctly: It is simply not the case that atheism is a lack of belief in gods, for there is a clear difference between the conscious consciousness-capable individual who lacks a belief in gods due to some cognitive impairment and the individual who lacks a belief in gods as a consequence of the use of his normally functioning cognitive faculties.

4. The Problem(s) Facing the Atheist

Thus, in attempting to work around having to make a positive assertion about God’s existence the atheist has cast a wide enough net to include nearly anyone and anything that absolutely lacks consciousness for the entirety of its life (e.g. persons) or the entirety of its endurance9 (e.g. physical objects), as well as persons who lack consciousness either temporarily or for the entirety of their lives. He has, moreover, moved from asserting something objective about God or gods (e.g. There are no gods) to asserting something subjective about himself (viz. “I lack a belief in gods”). The former has monumental implications for all of human history and society, while the latter is merely a report about the psychology of one individual who does not desire to state what he does believe. As we have shown above, the atheist is not one who merely lacks a belief in gods, but one who has received, evaluated, and rejected information about gods and has, by rational means, rejected those arguments as fallacious or unsound.

Once this is reckoned with, it must further be acknowledged that disbelief in a given proposition (e.g. God exists) is necessarily dependent upon a prior commitment to an unstated epistemology which axiomatically defines what is or is not proper evidence regarding the truth of a given proposition, and scrutinizes theistic arguments on that basis. Stated more broadly,

P is dubious iff it meets some prior condition of dubiousness. The prior condition of dubiousness, moreover, is either heuristic or indubitable. If heuristic, then P is heuristically or theoretically, but not actually, dubious. However, if indubitable then P is actually dubious. Given that the skeptic believes P to be actually dubious, then it follows that he likewise believes his prior condition of dubiousness to be indubitable.

What this means is that the atheist’s disbelief is the necessary consequence of his prior commitment to certain unstated positive beliefs. His disbelief is actively reached by means of his use of reason, it is not merely a lack of belief in gods. Rather, the atheist’s lack of belief in gods is the consequence of his rational criticism of theistic arguments, rational criticism which is dependent upon his prior positive and indubitable beliefs. The atheist believes that gods do not exist.

Additionally, the atheist faces the problem that all empirico-inductivists face – the problem of hasty generalization. Given the problem of induction, it follows that the atheist cannot appeal to his examination of his mental states to demonstrate that he lacks belief in gods. The parameters in which he is to perform such an induction remaining undefined and fluid, moreover, he cannot say he is either more or less certain that he is one who lacks belief in gods. This means that the atheist may speculate that he is one who lacks belief in gods, but he does not know this to be true, nor can he know it to be true. Rather, he has assumed as indubitable inductive parameters which may heuristically “prove” that he is one who lacks belief in gods. If he truly does lack belief in gods, this cannot be known to him by means of his own empirico-inductive reasoning.

§ V. Disambiguating “Existence”

Having demonstrated that the popular definition of atheism as a lack of belief in gods is untenable, we may now return to the question of existence. As we mentioned earlier on, assertions like “x exists” are either tautologous or non-tautologous. If they are tautologous, they are asserting nothing more than the proposition “This logical subject of predication is this logical subject of predication” or “x is x.” If they are non-tautologous, they are signifying some undefined property by the word exists. Assuming that the atheist intends to communicate something non-contradictory when he denies the existence of God, we must seek to understand what he means by the term exists.

As we begin, let us note that if by saying “There is no God” the atheist means “God cannot be empirically verified” or “There is no empirical being to which the term God properly applies” then he is confusing categories. As the London Baptist Confession of 1689, following the teaching of Scripture, states –

The Lord our God is…a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions.

The lack of empirical evidence for a being who is immaterial does not demonstrate that there is no such immaterial being. Some atheists will retort that immateriality is problematic, for it seems to allow us to affirm that there are other immaterial beings in addition to God. This, however, is neither a logical nor an ontological problem. It is a problem for the materialist who believes that “existence” is synonymous with an empirically verifiable material instantiation of a given entity. However, arguing against the idea that there is a God on such a basis is an exercise in circular reasoning.

What does the atheist mean by the proposition “There is no God”? Given that he cannot say that a lack of empirical evidence regarding a non-empirical being is proof that there is no such being, we can only conclude that his proposition means “There is no non-fictional being to which the term God properly applies.” More to the point, the atheist’s belief is that God is not real. Unlike the unclear assertion that “God does not exist,” the proposition “God is not real” asserts that a particular logical subject [viz. God] is merely conceptual [i.e. is not real].” And while this is much clearer, it still suffers from a host of problems which we will now examine.

1. The Problem of Objectivity

The atheist’s belief that God is “not real” (i.e. does not “exist”) presupposes that there is a reality which he and theists can and do know. And given that he assumes he and theists know this reality, he is further assuming that reality is objective, i.e. that its constituent objects and attributes are what they are independently of his or the theist’s subjective apprehension of them. What is real, then, is that which corresponds to the collection of objects and attributes that are what they are independently of our subjective apprehension of them. For the atheist, God does not correspond to the collection of objects and attributes that are what they are independently of our subjective apprehension of them. Therefore, the atheist believes that God is not real.

This reasoning is self-contradictory, for the act of scrutinizing any given entity is necessarily subjective. To put the matter clearly – One can only scrutinize a given entity by means of subjective apprehension. If one can only affirm as objectively real that which is what it is apart from one’s subjective apprehension of it, then one cannot affirm anything as real. This necessarily implies that the atheist cannot even affirm that there is an objective reality, for how could he verify that there is a collection of objects and attributes that are what they are apart from his subjective apprehension of them if he can only subjectively apprehend them?

The common reply to this is that the atheist can affirm certain entities as real by appealing to the testimony of others. However, this merely moves the problem backward by a step. For the atheist would still need to subjectively apprehend the testimony of others. He would not be obtaining knowledge about anything objective, therefore, by subjectively apprehending the testimony of others. And this introduces another problem.

2. The Problem of Other Minds

The problem of objectivity, as we have noted already, is not solved by appealing to the testimony of others. What’s more, appealing to the testimony of others presupposes that others have minds, and this is something that cannot be verified empirically either. One may attempt to sidestep this problem by asserting that the actions of other individuals necessarily signify that those individuals, like oneself, have a mind. But upon what basis? While some of the atheist’s physical activities may signify his correlative mental activities, this says nothing about the physical activities of others. How can the atheist know that the physical activities of others signify correlative mental activities? Upon what basis does the atheist believe that his own physical activities signify to others that he has a mind simultaneously performing correlative mental activities?

Given the problem of objectivity, he has no basis for believing that his actions signify to others at all. He believes that he knows his bodily activities correlate to his mental activities. And we may grant him that, for the sake of argument. But to extend this reality to others steps beyond what he claims to have empirical evidence for, namely the body-as-mind-signifier theory that undergirds his belief that one can observe the actions of another individual and soundly infer therefrom that that individual has a mind.

3. Other Problems of Induction

As atheism rejects the reality of an all knowing mind who is capable of revealing, and who has revealed, universal truths to men, it follows that universal affirmative and negative propositions are only approximately universal. Consequently, an atheist’s deductions from assumed universal propositions are always only approximately universal. Moreover, these approximations to universality are determined by the atheist himself who, by rejecting divine revelation, must determine the parameters of his inductions. These parameters, however, must also be determined by the atheist, leading to an infinite regress of such determinations, resulting with the atheist’s inability to justifiably assert any universal proposition to be or not be the case. The atheist, therefore, cannot claim to deductively prove any proposition he holds as true. Rather, his deductions are hypotheses given the inductive parameters he has arbitrarily established. The atheist is limited to inductive reasoning, in other words, which is even more of a problem for the following reasons.

a. Inductive Reasoning Implies Knowledge of at Least One Universal – This universal is what we may call the axiom of induction. It is the necessary presupposition that property sharing entities constitute a class. This axiom lies at the foundation of all induction, but it cannot be established by induction without the atheist already employing it. The axiom is a true proposition, and this is a problem for the atheist. For to whom does the truth belong? Whose mind is the source of this proposition? It cannot be the atheist, for the atheist is limited in what he knows, as well as in how he can possibly come to know what he knows, and the axiom of induction is a true universal proposition that cannot be established by means of induction.

b. Induction is Secondary to Deduction from the Axiom of Induction – Given that induction presupposes the axiom of induction, it follows that every induction proceeds upon the basis of a prior necessary deduction from the axiom of induction. The set of particulars from which the atheist desires to draw conclusions is generated by a deduction from the axiom of induction, namely –

All property sharing entities constitute a set.
A, B, C...n+1 are property sharing entities
Therefore, A, B, C...n+1 constitute a set.

The deduction of a set from the axiom of induction, therefore, precedes all induction. This elementary observation has profound implications, for it necessarily implies that the laws of inference precede induction and cannot be justified by an appeal to inductive arguments, for every induction follows from the deduction of sets from the axiom of deduction.

c. Deductive Set Generation Implies the Priority of the Laws of Logic & Deductive Inference – It is not problematic for the atheist merely that an axiom precedes the atheist’s attempt to draw inductive inferences, nor is it problematic for the atheist merely that a necessary deduction precedes his inductive reasoning. What is even more problematic for the atheist here is the fact that set generation depends upon the laws of logic – viz. the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of the excluded middle – as well as the rules of inference. The laws identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, as well as the rules by which we may know if our deductively drawn conclusions are valid or invalid are propositions that precede the minds of all men. To whom, therefore, do these ideas belong?

§ VI. Does the Atheist Have Justification for his Belief?

Now that we have cleared away the brush from the atheist’s ambiguous language, we may ask –

Does the atheist have justification for asserting that God is not real?

No, he does not. This is so for the reasons we have established above, which we will now summarize very briefly.

1. The atheist does not, and cannot, have access to objective reality if he is confined to empirico-inductive reasoning. Because he cannot, and does not, have access to objective reality, he has no basis for believing that there is a collection of objects and attributes that are what they are apart from his subjective apprehension of them.

2. The atheist cannot verify that there is an objective reality, moreover, by appealing to the testimony of others. Because he has no access to objective reality, he can only subjectively apprehend the testimony of others. He also cannot justify his belief that these other minds are themselves objectively real, since he is not identical to them. He presupposes that his bodily activity correlates to his mental activity, with the body serving as a signifying mechanism to himself and others, but he cannot say that the same is true of others. Thus, even an appeal to the physical activities of others does not prove that they have minds like his own. He is, in the final analysis, confined to his subjectivity.

3. Inductive reasoning proceeds upon the basis of (a.) the axiom of induction, (b.) the deductive generation of sets, (c.) the laws of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, and (d.) the laws of deductive inference. The axiom of induction, the deductive generation of sets – i.e. the discursive application of the laws of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and deductive inference – are all immaterial content. Prior to induction, therefore, there are propositions that can be understood by finite minds, but which cannot be generated by finite minds.

In summation, the atheist’s belief that “God is not real” is one that he can only make by first presupposing that there is a mind that possesses and has generated universal truths apart from which man’s thinking cannot even get off of the ground. The atheist is not only unable to assert that God is not real, he is unable to assert that there is such a thing as reality at all.

§ VII. Is God Real?

Consequently, atheism is intelligible if an only if God is real; but if atheism is intelligible, then God is real, and atheism is necessarily false. This means that given atheism, atheism is logically possible but ontologically impossible. The assertion “God is not real” is proof that he is, in fact, real, and it implies that the atheist knows this to be true. This is so because the atheist utilizes universal truths – e.g. the laws of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, deductive inference, etc – which he believes will lead him to objective truth – i.e. knowledge of things as they are apart from his subjective apprehension of them. If the atheist truly does not view the laws mentioned above as anything more than social constructs, then he can offer his opinion about theism, as well as his opinions on any other matter – including, in fact, his opinions concerning what reality is – but he cannot hope to come to know the truth about theism or atheism, or any other matter. Professing himself to be wise, he has become a fool.

§ VIII. Concluding Remarks

In his paper “Atheism,” Gordon H. Clark, in accord with the view expressed by the present author, wrote the following –

At first it may seem strange that knowledge of what God is more important than knowledge that God is. His essence or nature being more important than his existence may seem unusual. Existentialists insist that existence precedes essence. Nevertheless, competent Christians disagree for two reasons. First, we have seen that pantheists identify god with the universe. What is god? —the universe. The mere fact that they use the name god for the universe and thus assert that god "exists" is of no help to Christianity.

The second reason for not being much interested in the existence of God is somewhat similar to the first. The idea existence is an idea without content. Stars exist—but this tells us nothing about the stars; mathematics exists—but this teaches us no mathematics; hallucinations also exist. The point is that a predicate, such as existence, that can be attached to everything indiscriminately tells us nothing about anything. A word, to mean something, must also not mean something. For example, if I say that some cats are black, the sentence has meaning only because some cats are white. If the adjective were attached to every possible subject—so all cats were black, all stars were black, and all politicians were black, as well as all the numbers in arithmetic, and God too—then the word black would have no meaning. It would not distinguish anything from something else. Since everything exists, exists is devoid of information. That is why the Catechism asks, What is God? Not, Does God exist?10

Clark understood that the question of God’s “existence” needed to be clarified in order to be understood and addressed. Once this is done, it is plain to see that atheists are not concerned with the “existence” of God but with his “reality.” This “reality” must be defined as well, but for the atheist there is no way of justifying a concept of such an objective “reality.” Apart from a non-empirical, disembodied, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, omnipresent mind, the universal truths requisite to cogent reasoning and speculation in the matters of metaphysics, epistemology, and even science do not “exist,” i.e. are not “real.” They are, instead, mere assertions whose truth value is uncritically accepted by the atheist in his complaints against Christianity.

In his attempt to identify God as unreal, the atheist turns to creation and imbues it with divinity. Not only does matter become the source of all power, all order, all modes of being, all knowledge, all history, whose ever evasive essence can only be known by a process of negative abstraction from reflection on physical things (i.e. the via negativa) – it becomes the teleological terminus of all of the atheist’s thinking and acting. Whereas Christianity loudly proclaims Soli Deo Gloria!, the atheist affirms Solam Materiam Gloria! And by so doing confirms that his lack of belief in other gods, including the one true God, does not indicate that he lacks belief in all gods. For the atheist, there is only one ontological entity greater than which none may be conceived; and that entity we all know as Matter.

1 Rom 1:19-21.
2 Rom 1:23.
3 The Expositor’s Bible Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 267.
4 “What is an Atheist?,” American Atheists, https://www.atheists.org/activism/resources/about-atheism, Accessed March 22, 2019.
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 “Atheism and Agnosticism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/, Accessed March 22, 2019.
9 This should be understood in the ontological sense.
10 “Atheism,” Trinity Foundation, http://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/The%20Trinity%20Review%200032a%20Atheism.pdf, Accessed April 25, 2019, 3.

Editor’s Note:  This post first appeared on Biblical Trinitarian http://www.biblicaltrinitarian.com/2018/11/is-critical-race-theory-anti-christian.html and is presented here without alteration.  With Critical Race Theory growing in popularity among putatively conservative Evangelicals, author Hiram R. Diaz III offers a much-needed refutation of this anti-christian idea.

Matthew Mullins, professor at Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, has a series of articles titled “Is Critical Race Theory [hereafter, CRT] ‘UnChristian,’” in which he seeks to demonstrate that CRT is not incompatible with the Christian faith. The articles form an apologetic defense of the recent utilization of CRT by professing evangelical leaders (e.g. Al Mohler, Thabiti Anyabwile, Russell Moore, and others) who are presently attempting to make “social justice” issues a primary concern for all Christians. This has been the cause of conflict between themselves and other evangelical leaders, as well as their congregants and other like-minded believers, who see such an emphasis on “social justice” issues as contradictory to the central role of the church in preaching and teaching the Scriptures (summarily expressed by the Law and the Gospel), and not engaging in social activism.

The upsurge in evangelical proponents of CRT has led a wide variety of non-CRT evangelical pastors, leaders, thinkers, and personalities to draft “The Statement on Social Justice & the Gospel,” wherein they explain their stance as regards the various “social justice” issues that have been raised by evangelical CRT proponents.[1] Their opposition to CRT is not only due to CRT proponent’s marginalization of the preaching of the Word of God, and their simultaneous privileging of “social justice” issues, but also due to the fact that CRT is derived from the presuppositions and concerns of postmodernist philosophers and social theorists. Opponents of CRT have rightly noted that the philosophical origins of CRT, from which CRT concerns and goals take root, are diametrically opposed to the main beliefs forming the foundation of the Christian worldview. In response, CRT proponents have sought to defend their synthesis of CRT categories, concepts, beliefs, and goals with the Christian faith.

However, the proponents of CRT have not given a biblical defense of the underlying philosophical beliefs which undergird it. This is either due to their unfamiliarity with those beliefs, their desire to avoid having to deal with the contradiction that arises between CRT’s philosophical foundations and the Christian worldview, or their inability to see how the Christian faith and CRT are diametrically opposed at the presuppositional level. This article, therefore, will follow Mullins’ definition of CRT, its core beliefs, and its proponents’ goals. It will then identify the philosophical origins of CRT and explain why it is not only un-Christian but foundationally anti-Christian and, therefore, to be denounced by the people of God.

§ II. Defining Critical Race Theory, 

Its Core Beliefs, and Its Proponents’ Goals

Mullins begins his series by defining CRT. Mullins –

CRT is a complex system of beliefs that emerged in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s to call attention to and redress the subtler forms of racism that replaced the overt racism made largely unacceptable by the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.[2]

These beliefs are identified in later articles to be the following –

1. “Race is social construct”[3] – This “means that race is a social reality rather than a biological reality. It does not mean that they think that everyone’s skin is the same color. It means that the characteristics we associate with those colors are imposed rather than inherent. Race is something we have invented to organize our world, rather than a product of our DNA. And for CRT, folks with lighter skin have organized the world based on values assigned to colors that privilege themselves and oppress people with darker skin.”[4] 

2. “Racism is Structural”[5] – Mullins explains that for CRT proponents “racism is thus not only treating someone badly because their skin color is different from yours. Racism is a huge, complicated, historical system. It is the very way our world has been organized over time to empower folks who came to understand themselves as white and to subjugate those who fall outside that category.”[6]

3. “Colorblindness is a Problem, not a Solution”[7] – For CRT proponents, “the idea of treating people the same ‘regardless’ of their histories is why racism persists.”[8] CRT proponents argue that “if racism has evolved over time into an integral part of the structure of our society, and if that structure holds some people back and gives others a leg up, then to treat all those people the same is to maintain a status quo that disenfranchises some and privileges others.”[9] 

4. “Interest Convergence, not Pure Progress”[10] – Mullins relays that “Interest convergence is the idea that dominant groups only acquiesce to minority interests when those interests converge with their own.”[11] In other words, CRT proponents believe that at times changes in society affecting racial groups are wrongly identified as “progress” when in reality they have only come about because they changes that are “in the best interest of the dominant culture, not because [they are] truly just, fair, or best for minorities.”[12] 

5. “Whiteness is Normative”[13] – For CRT proponents, “whiteness has come to seem normal over time, making everything else non-normal, or other. To put it another way, whiteness and everything associated with being white has become the standard for how a person should be...CRT criticizes the idea that we can be neutral, objective, or colorblind when it comes to race. If we are trying to be neutral, then we are inevitably reinforcing the status quo, or the norm, and the norm is to live and behave like white people.”[14]

6. “Intersectionality”[15] – As Mullins states, “intersectionality is the study of how different identity categories overlap.”[16] Consequently, “proponents of CRT who study intersectionality typically believe that people living at the intersection of multiple oppressed identity categories face unique forms of discrimination that require equally unique forms of defense.”[17]

These core beliefs undergird the CRT proponent’s activities. CRT proponents see themselves are actively being committed to “expanding history,”[18] which is to say “telling a more complete story of United States history than many of us learned in school.”[19] They also “critique colorblindness,”[20] by “focus[ing] on revealing how stories, laws, customs, and decisions that seem to be neutral, or colorblind, are actually built on assumptions about race.”[21] Additionally, CRT proponents seek to “make the legal system fairer,”[22] “advocate for voting rights,”[23] and “change speech norms.”[24]

§ III. A Necessary Clarification

Having defined CRT, its core beliefs, and its proponents’ goals, we must make a necessary point of clarification. The proponents of CRT represent their stated goals as being in line with the second greatest commandment to love one’s neighbor as oneself, and because of this do not think their views should be called unChristian, let alone anti-Christian. This sidesteps the underlying issue – the fact that the philosophical underpinnings of CRT, from which perceived social ills spring and are identifiable as social ills, are anti-Christian. The disagreement between proponents of CRT and opponents of CRT is not one over whether or not Christians should love their neighbors as themselves. Rather, the disagreement is over the compatibility of CRT, as a post-structuralist-influenced/postmodern philosophical tool for social “change,” and the Christian worldview. The short answer is that they are not at all compatible, although they may share a superficial concern for rectifying some of the social ills we and our neighbors may experience. We will demonstrate this is the case below.

§ IV. The Origins of CRT

When we speak of the origins of CRT, we may be referring to the historical beginnings of the actual discipline or the philosophical foundations upon which CRT has been built. It is all too often the case that proponents of CRT will point to the historical beginnings of CRT when discussing its origins, presumably seeking to distance it from the halls of academia. Mullins does just this in his article explaining the “origins” of CRT, writing –

Critical Race Theory was not born out of a university department. It did not emerge from a political party, think tank, or policy center. It was a natural reaction to the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. While overt forms of racism such as discriminatory hiring practices and voter intimidation had been made illegal thanks to civil rights activists, new forms of racism emerged that required new forms of resistance and new forms of legal defense.[25]

By denying that it originated in a university department, and by stating that it was “anatural reaction to the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s,” Mullins suggests that CRT is not tied to any particular philosophical worldview. It was a “natural [moral?] reaction” to historical circumstances, claims Mullins, but CRT scholars do not agree. For instance, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic state that –

As a scholarly movement, Critical Race Theory (CRT) began in the early 1970s with the early writing of Derrick Bell, an African-American civil rights lawyer and the first black to teach at Harvard Law School. Writing about interest convergence as a means of understanding Western racial historyl and the conflict of interest in civil rights litigation (the lawyer or litigation fund wants a breakthrough; the client or her group, better schools), Bell was one of a small but growing group of scholars and minority activists who realized that the gains of the heady civil rights era had stalled and, indeed, were being rolled back.[26]

Delgado and Stefancic are even more specific in their introductory work on the subject, writing –

The [CRT] movement is a collection of activists and scholars interested in studying and transforming the relationship among race, racism, and power. The movement considers many of the same issues that conventional civil rights and ethnic studies discourses take up, but places them in a broader perspective that includes economics, history, context, group- and self-interest, and even feelings and the unconscious. Unlike traditional civil rights, which embraces step-by-step progress, critical race theory questions the very foundations of the liberal order, including, equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral practices of constitutional law.[27]

Rather than placing the origin of CRT in a “natural reaction” or in some non-academic context, CRT scholars openly recognize that CRT was indeed birthed within the very context of academia.

Critical Legal Studies & Its Discontents: 

Truth and Consciousness as the Possessor and Revealer of Truth

Thus, the origin of CRT lies directly in the work of legal scholars emerging from Critical Legal Studies (hereafter, CLS), a “wing of legal theory,” according to Raymond Wacks, that “generally spurns many of the enterprises that have long been assumed to be at the heart of jurisprudence.”[28] CLS embraces an anti-Enlightenment worldview which rejects many of the core assumptions of the Christian faith, as derived from the Scriptures. For instance, Wacks explains that “the primary purpose of critical legal theory...is to contest the universal rational foundation of law which, it maintains, clothes the law and legal system with a spurious legitimacy.”[29] Rather than viewing Law as originating in the mind of God,

...CLS detects in the law a form of ‘hegemonic consciousness’, a term borrowed from the writings of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, who observed that social order is maintained by a system of beliefs which are accepted as ‘common sense’ and part of the natural order – even by those who are actually subordinated to it. In other words, these ideas are treated as eternal and necessary whereas they really reflect only the transitory, arbitrary interests of the dominant elite.[30]

Universal and absolute rules, consequently, were viewed as local and relative strictures imposed by those with power on their subordinates. As Duncan Kennedy explains –

Legal behavior and legal thought, with their prestige and claims to universality and rationality, have an important effect, the Gramscian-type argument would go, in maintaining the hegemony of ruling class people over this influential professional, technical, intellectual sector which administers the legal system. The legal system maintains the social structure of the capitalist state. It requires legal workers and has got to have some way of keeping their loyalty.[31]

Law is a human construct that serves human ends, in other words, and nothing more.

CLS, following Freudian psychoanalysis, also psychologized “legal thought,” identifying it as “a form of ‘denial’...[which] affords a way of coping with contradictions that are too painful for us to hold in our conscious mind...[by denying] the contradiction between the promise, on the one hand of, say, equality and freedom, and the reality of oppression and hierarchy, on the other.”[32] The underlying assumption of Freud’s concept of denial is, we must note, the belief that what is truly taking place in the unconscious mind of man is only perceivable by analysis of his patterns of speech and behavior. What is explicitly identified as the true content of a man’s mind, by the man himself, is to be understood as a socially approved of means of communicating socially disapproved of desires for animalistic “needs” (e.g. violence, sex, power).

CRT: The Fruit of Philosophy,

Not a “Natural Reaction” to Moral Evils

In contradiction to Mullins' claims regarding the origin of CRT, then, it is plain to see the anti-Enlightenment – and by implication anti-Christian[33] – philosophical roots of CRT without much effort.

§ IV. Why CRT is Anti-Christian

1. Reality, Language, and Law – The Christian Worldview

At this point, it should be evident to the reader that the worldview espoused by CLS, and which forms the foundation of CRT and social justice advocacy, is essentially opposed to the Christian faith. Metaphysically, i.e. as regards the fundamental nature of reality, the Scriptures show us that our creaturely reality was brought forth,[34] is now being sustained,[35] will be destroyed, and will be recreated by the Word of God.[36] As the psalmist declares –

By the Word of the Lord the heavens were made,and by the breath of his mouth all their hosts.[37]

Moreover, what God has decreed to come about will not fail to materialize,[38] for God “works all things according to the counsel of his will.”[39] All of creation obeys the Word of God, the command of God that these things should exist and do what he desires them to do. And if the entirety of creation and its existence is under the Law-Word of God, then so are the actions of all men. 

Hence, when Paul declares that “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God,”[40] he implicitly reinforces what he’s already stated explicitly to his hearers inRom 2:12-16: The same moral Law of God addresses all men. The Scriptures teach us that the work of the Law is written on the hearts of all humans,[41] irrespective of their national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or gender differences. The Law of God, therefore, does not see color, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, or even age – the Law of God sees guilt or innocence.

God’s rule by Law is evident, therefore, in the governance of the created order, but it is even more so evident in the universal knowledge of God as Creator, Law-Giver, and Judge. According to the apostle Paul, all men know God has created them to obey his Law, but they reject his law. According to the apostle Paul, all men know the difference between good and bad (i.e. righteous and unrighteous) behavior. All men will be judged on the basis of God’s revealed truth, be it merely general revelation or general and special revelation. Psalm 19 aptly articulates the triadic reign of God’s Law over the creation in general (vv.1–6), over all men in general (vv.7–10), and over particular men (vv.11-14). God teaches us that there is a inextricable link between reality, language, and law that reflects the life of our Creator, Redeemer, and Judge.

2. Power is God’s Possession to Distribute as He Sees Fit

The human establishment and exercise of civil laws by words is not a human contrivance, let alone a human practice which originated only a few hundred years ago (i.e. since the Enlightenment period). Man, as the image of God,[42] a prioriunderstands that there is an inextricable link between reality, language, and law. He further understands that law is a legitimate, divinely ordained means of exercising divinely bestowed power. This is hinted at in Gen 2:18-20, in which Adam reflects God’s act of naming creation in Gen 1 by naming various animals brought to him by God. Adam’s exercise of language assumes the inextricable link between reality, language, and law, and it assumes as legitimate the expression of power via legal language.

Adam received power from God, as all men do. For according to the Scriptures, “power belongs to God.”[43] As the prophet Samuel’s mother declares,

The Lord kills and brings to life; he brings down to Sheol and raises up. The Lord makes poor and makes rich; he brings low and he exalts. He raises up the poor from the dust; he lifts the needy from the ash heap to make them sit with princes and inherit a seat of honor. For the pillars of the earth are the Lord's, and on them he has set the world.[44]

And as the prophet Daniel tells us  Nebuchadnezzar likewise proclaimed –

“Blessed be the name of God forever and ever, to whom belong wisdom and might. He changes times and seasons; he removes kings and sets up kings...”[45]

And as the Lord Jesus Christ also declares to Pontius Pilate –

“You would have no authority over me at all unless it had been given you from above...”[46]

Rather than identifying political structures of power as illegitimate mechanisms of oppression, the Scriptures identify them as divinely ordained institutions for the well-being of human society. In contradiction to CRT, Scripture teaches us that power does not originate with men individually or collectively. Power is the sole possession of God; he distributes it, on loan as it were, to whomever he wishes, as he sees fit. 

The apostle Paul relays these truths unambiguously in his epistle to the Romans, writing –

...there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of the one who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, for he is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain. For he is the servant of God, an avenger who carries out God's wrath on the wrongdoer. Therefore one must be in subjection, not only to avoid God's wrath but also for the sake of conscience. For the same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are ministers of God, attending to this very thing. Pay to all what is owed to them: taxes to whom taxes are owed, revenue to whom revenue is owed, respect to whom respect is owed, honor to whom honor is owed.[47]

While we recognize that there are historical events that lead to the formation of governing bodies, we also must recognize that it is God who has appointed these authorities to judge the actions of men and women impartially.

3. Impartiality is Not Impossible, if Properly Understood

From the above, we see that the Christian faith does not sever reality, language, and law from one another. We also see that God has given men the ability to rule by laws expressed in language. It is this judgment by the law of God that can properly be called impartial, seeing as its goal is to glorify God, not to attend to the needs, demands, and desires of any human individual or group. As it is written –

“You shall do no injustice in court. You shall not be partial to the poor or defer to the great, but in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor.”[48]

One can only show true impartiality by judging all men by the Law of God. CRT, and social justice advocacy, assume a concept of law that is purely socio-historical, non-divine in origin, and, therefore, identifies all laws as partial by virtue of their being expressed by different individuals and groups. Yet the Scriptures are clear – impartial judgment is judgment according to the Word of God.

4. Biblical Epistemology is Thoroughly Anti-Relativistic

We have already noted that CLS and CRT assume a form of ethical/moral relativism. What the reader should note here, however, is that ethical/moral propositions (e.g. “Income inequality is immoral”) constitute knowledge claims. Ethical/moral items of knowledge are viewed as relative to historically ensconced persons and groups, which implies that truth itself is relative. This is necessarily implied by their doctrine. However, we may further substantiate this assertion by reminding the reader that CRT, following CLS and the post-structuralist/postmodernist philosophers who influenced that school of jurisprudence, axiomatically denies all forms of essentialism. Consequently, CRT reduces categories of being and thought to heuristic tools to be used in the service of achieving whatever ends are in view by CRT proponents. The denial of all forms of essentialism renders all “knowledge” relative to historically ensconced persons and groups. Such a relativized understanding of knowledge, and therefore truth itself, stands in stark contradiction to the teaching of Scripture. 

God’s Word teaches us that what it proclaims to be the case is actually the case. Scripture is replete with examples of this, but here we will offer two that are sufficient, seeing as they are universal in scope.

The sum of your word is truth, and every one of your righteous rules endures forever.[49]

Sanctify them in the truth; your word is truth.[50]

Given that the Scriptures are the Word of God communicated by various men throughout history, it follows that the truth is not relative to particular individuals or groups. CRT’s assumption that truths are relative to specific persons or groups is not only self-referentially absurd, therefore, but diametrically opposed to the teaching of Scripture regarding the nature of knowledge, truth, and, by implication, man.

5. Biblical Anthropology Militates Against CRT

We again must underscore CRT’s commitment to anti-Enlightenment concepts derived from the Christian worldview. As regards anthropology, what is renounced by CRT is the concept of subjectivity divorced from any particularities of history, ethnicity, language, gender, et al. Whereas the Scriptures teach us that every individual who ever has existed, is now existing, and will later exist is made in the image of God,[51] CRT undermines this by renouncing any concept of “abstract” subjectivity. The contradiction that obtains here is plain to see. Scripture teaches that all persons have an essential nature that makes them human; CRT denies all forms of essentialism, including anthropological essentialism.

6. The Incarnation and CRT are Mutually Exclusive

Christians affirm that the Eternal Son of God, Second Person of the Trinity, became “became flesh and dwelt among us.”[52] He was “made like [us] in every respect, so that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people.”[53] This means that “when the fullness of time was come, [Christ took] upon him man's nature, with all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin.”[54] Thus, we affirm “that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion; which person is very God and very man, yet one Christ, the only mediator between God and man.”[55] God the Son truly became truly human, sharing every aspect of our human nature in its uncorrupted and sinless state. Hence, Scripture declares him to be “the last”[56] and “second Adam.”[57]

Christ, in other words, is truly God and truly man. The two natures are united in one divine person, implying that the knowledge of the incarnate Son did not differ in kind from the knowledge he possessed prior to his incarnation, nor does it differ now. Knowledge is not dependent upon history, nor is it dependent upon one’s socio-historical conditions; knowledge is God's possession. Neither Christ’s gender, nor his skin color, nor his language, nor his height, nor his hair length, nor his weight, nor his eye color made him possess knowledge he otherwise would not have possessed had he been born, for instance, a wealthy, white Scandinavian aristocrat. The knowledge Christ has as the God-Man is identical in substance to the knowledge he possessed prior to his incarnation. This is a necessary implication of the doctrine of the hypostatic union of the human and divine natures in the Second Person of the Trinity.

Given the doctrine of the hypostatic union, therefore, we must affirm that whatever divinely revealed knowledge we possess is substantially identical to that knowledge as it exists in the mind of God. The true propositions we possess are identical in substance to those which God possesses, and cannot be otherwise, since the Son of God as one divine person with two distinct natures knew, and knows, such propositions as both God and man. This is a reality that contradicts CRT’s relativistic epistemology in which persons and groups of persons have access to truths that are unknowable by other persons and groups of persons differing with respect to historical placement, skin color, language, weight, height, gender, socio-political status, and so on.

CRT and the doctrine of the incarnation cannot be held together simultaneously without contradiction, for CRT implies that there are “truths” that are inseparable from the human particularities mentioned above, but the incarnation shows us that there are no truths that are inseparable from the human particularities of an individual person or group's existence, seeing as the Lord Jesus Christ’s possession of universal and absolute truths was not dependent upon those human particularities mentioned above. Either CRT is correct, therefore, and Christ could not have known universal and absolute truths, or Christ did know universal and absolute truths, and CRT is false. These options are mutually exclusive.

§ V. Conclusion/s

Contemporary Christian proponents of CRT and social justice advocacy are either not being upfront about the academic and philosophical origins of CRT and social justice, or they are ignorant of their origins. If they are not being honest about this matter, Christians have every right to question the veracity of their claim that CRT is not unChristian. Likewise, if the proponents of CRT and social justice are ignorant as to the origins of CRT and social justice, Christians have every right to question the veracity of the claim that CRT is not unChristian. We are under obligation to test all things by the Word of God, accepting what is explicitly and/or implicitly taught therein; we are also obligated to reject what has no basis in the Scriptures.

What we do not have the liberty to do is accept the claims of CRT and social justice advocacy proponents as true without first scrutinizing them in the pure light of God’s holy Word. As is usually the case in church history, proponents of false teaching often claim to be taking the moral high ground by promulgating their false teaching. One need look no further than the so-called “Emerging church” movement just over a decade ago to see this tactic in action.[58] It is necessary for us, therefore, to know whether or not a new teaching or framework for understanding some Scriptural reality (in this case, i.e. that of racism, sins of partiality and violence) is fundamentally, essentially, at odds with the Christian faith. When we do, we will be able to properly differentiate legitimate moral concerns and commands from illegitimate moral concerns and commands.[59]

Having established that CRT is foundationally anti-Christian and, therefore, incompatible with Christianity, indeed contradictory to its main beliefs regarding the Son of God’s person and work, we may better understand why it is that CRT and social justice advocacy mistakenly identify acts of mercy as acts of justice. CRT and social justice advocacy rest upon a worldview that is contrary to the Scriptures at nearly every turn, thus their fruits are equally corrupt. The central issue in this matter, then, is not whether or not the church is to uphold justice, nor whether or not the church is to despise all forms of partiality and embrace persons of all socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds, nor whether or not the Scriptures command us to love our neighbors by showing them mercy and kindness. The central issue is this – Are the Scriptures sufficient, or not?

1 See, “The Statement on Social Justice & The Gospel,” https://statementonsocialjustice.com.

2 “Is Critical Race Theory ‘UnChristian’ Part 1,” Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary,

http://kingdomdiversity.sebts.edu/index.php/2018/10/12/is-critical-race-theory-unchristian-part-1/, accessed October 18, 2018.

3 “Is Critical Race Theory ‘UnChristian’ Part 3,” Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, http://kingdomdiversity.sebts.edu/index.php/2018/10/03/is-critical-race-theory-unchristian-part-3/,accessed October 18, 2018.

4 ibid.

5 ibid.

6 ibid.

7 “Is Critical Race Theory ‘UnChristian’ Part 4,” Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary,
http://kingdomdiversity.sebts.edu/index.php/2018/10/01/is-critical-race-theory-unchristian-part-4/, accessed October 18, 2018.

8 ibid.

9 ibid.

10 ibid.

11 ibid.

12 ibid.

13 ibid.

14 ibid.

15 “Is Critical Race Theory ‘UnChristian’ Part 5,” Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 
http://kingdomdiversity.sebts.edu/index.php/2017/10/26/is-critical-race-theory-unchristian-part-5/, accessed October 18, 2018.

16 ibid.

17 ibid.

18 ibid.

19 ibid.

20 ibid.

21 ibid.

22 ibid.

23 ibid.

24 ibid.

25 “Is Critical Race Theory ‘UnChristian’ Part 5,” Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 
http://kingdomdiversity.sebts.edu/index.php/2018/10/14/is-critical-race-theory-unchristian-part-2/. accessed October 18, 2018. (emphasis added)

26 “Critical Race Theory: Past, Present, and Future,” in Current Legal Problems 1998: Legal Theory at the End of the Millenium ed. Michael Freeman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 467. (emphasis added)

27 Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (New York & London: New York University Press, 2001), 2-3. (emphasis added)

28 Philosophy of Law: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 92.

29 ibid. (emphasis added)

30 ibid., 95.

31 “Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System,” in ALSA Forum Vol. VI. No. 1 (1982), 36.

32 Wacks, Philosophy of Law, 95.

33 While Christianity does not embrace the Enlightenment ideals of human ethical, epistemological, and social autonomy, it does agree with the Enlightenment’s concepts of rational universality, ontological essentialism, and epistemological foundationalism.

34 cf. Gen 1:1, Ps 33:6, John 1:1-3, 2nd Pet 3:5, Heb 1:1-2 & 11:3.

35 cf. Heb 1:3.

36 cf. 2nd Pet 3:5-7.

37 Ps 33:6.

38 cf. Ps 33:9.

39 Eph 1:11.

40 cf. Rom 3:23.

41 cf. Rom 1:18-19 & 32; 2:14-15.

42 cf. Gen 1:26-27 & 9:6; Luke 20:23-25; 1st Cor 11:7; James 3:9.

43 Ps 62:11

44 1st Sam 2:6-8. (emphasis added)

45 Dan 2:20-21. (emphasis added)

46 John 19:11a. (emphasis added)

47 Rom 13:1b-7. (emphasis added)

48 Lev 19:15.

49 Ps 119:160. (emphasis added)

50 John 17:17. (emphasis added)

51 cf. Gen 1:26-27.

52 John 1:14a.

53 Heb 2:17.

54 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith, Ch. 8, Art. 2. (emphasis added)

55 ibid. (emphasis added)

56 1st Cor 15:45.

57 1st Cor 15:47.

58 See Diaz, Hiram R. “Heretics that are Holier Than You,” Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry Official Blog, 

https://web.archive.org/web/20121103061646/http://blog.carm.org/2011/06/heretics-that-are-holier-than-you/.

59 There are several contemporary authors who have provided very useful resources in this regard. See Beisner, Calvin E. Social Justice vs. Biblical Justice: How Good Intentions Undermine Justice and the Gospel (Good Trees Press: 2018), 46pp; Clark, R. Scott. “Resources on the Social Gospel and Social Justice,” The Heidelblog, https://heidelblog.net/2018/04/resources-on-the-social-gospel-social-justice/; Harrison, Darrell B. “The Fault in Their (Social) Gospel,” Just Thinking...For Myself,
 https://justthinking.me/2018/08/31/the-fault-in-their-social-gospel/, and “The Misleading Language of the Social Justice Movement,” https://justthinking.me/2018/05/13/the-misleading-language-of-the-social-justice-movement/; Buice, Josh. “The Broken Road of the Social Gopel,” Delivered by Grace, 
http://www.deliveredbygrace.com/the-broken-road-of-the-social-gospel/; Sey, Samuel. “Social Justice is a Threat to Human Rights and the Gospel,” Statement on Social Justice and the Gospel, https://statementonsocialjustice.com/articles/social-justice-threat-human-rights/; Hall, Amy K. “If We Lose the Meaning of ‘Justice,’ We Lose the Gospel,” Stand to Reason, https://www.str.org/blog/if-we-lose-meaning-justice-we-lose-gospel.